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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH 
POHCCPINE RESER\rOIR COM-
p. \ ~ Y. a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LLOYD\\'. KELLER CORPORA-
TIOX, a corporation; AVON LAND 
AXD LIYESTOCK COMPANY, 
a eorporation; H. A. SUMMERS, 
and C L E L L .A SU~IMERS, his 
wife: II. i\. SP:\I~IERS, JR., and 
'l HS. H. i\. SU~IMERS, JR., his 
wife. Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
9961 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
SPPPLE)IEXTAL STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
The record on appeal in this case consists of the 
" court file containing the pleadings, notices, stipulations, 
jury instructions, verdict, judgn1ent and minute or-
der~. a transcript of the proceedings before trial, and 
certain Exhibits containing a tabulation of testimony 
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as to values and damages introduced on direct exami-
nation. The transcript of the testimony at the five-day 
trial is not before this Court. Only 14 out of 63 Ex-
hibits which were received in evidence are included in 
the record. 
The respondent specifically objects to the following 
statements in the appellants' Statement of Facts, " ... 
The defendants, through their counsel, requested sepa-
rate trials and said request was denied by the court" 
and "The testimony of all witnesses as to value and dam-
ages, by stipulation of counsel, was reduced to exhibits 
and received in evidence." There is no record to sup-
port these statements. There was much testimony as to 
value and damages adduced on both direct and cross-
examination which does not appear on the exhibits. 
The defendants filed a motion for a new trial. The 
motion was argued orally and written briefs were filed. 
The plaintiff filed the first brief directed to the points 
raised by the defendants and orally argued at the hear-
Ing. 
"1. Whether each defendant was entitled to 
three peremptory challenges and if so whether 
failure to demand such additional challenges con-
stituted a waiver. 
2. Whether the verdict is sustained by the evi-
dence. 
3. Whether the Court can deny the motion for 
new trial upon the condition that the plaintiff 
pay the defendant an amount in excess of the 
verdict.'' ( R. 97) . 
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The trial court wrote a tnetnorandtun decision which 
provitkd that unless the plaintiff consented that the 
wparate n.'rdids as to l(eller and Avan be increased 
hy ~titi-UJO and ~158.00 respectively, the motion for 
n rww trial would be granted. (R. 104). The plaintiff 
consented. (It. 106). The n10tion was denied. (R. 109). 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
I 
The appellants did not object to one trial affecting 
the sqmrate parcels and the court did not abuse its 
discretion in so conducting the trial. 
II 
'fhe order denying the motion for a new trial 
must be affirmed because there is no evidence before 
this court showing an abuse of discretion. 
III 
Additur was proper and in granting Additur there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
IV 
The court did not err in suspending interest. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE APPELLANTS DID NOT OBJECT 
TO ONE TRIAL AFFECTING SEPARATE 
PARCELS AND THE COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SO CONDUCT-
ING THE TRIAL. 
Although the appellants have included in the record 
on appeal a transcript of the proceedings at seven hear-
ings before the trial there is nothing in the record which 
discloses any request for separate trials covering each 
separately owned parcel of land condemned. 
No motion for separate trials was made. The only 
reference to the subject appears on page 120 of the 
transcript of proceedings before trial (R. 235, 236) 
as follows: 
"THE COURT: Well, I understand, but 
as far as the jury is concerned, if there's going 
to be any-if you're concerned about the one 
half interest, we can ask them what Nuhn and 
Summers' property is worth. Then after the ver-
dict is in the court can cut it in half. Either way 
is all right. 
MR. MANN: I wouldn't want to .. try it that 
way, because it's got to be on the record so it 
would equal what he's asked for, an undivided 
one half. 
THE COURT: It would be the same thing 
as to Mr. Keller. 'Ve're trying them altogether 
now. No such thing as separate lawsuits. 'Ve 
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simply haven't got the time to try them sepa-
rately. 
:\I H. SKEEN: \Veil, Mr. Keller, of course, 
owns a hundred per cent. 
TilE COURT: That's right, but there will 
all be special questions to the jury. 
:\IR. SI\:EEN: The case will be tried together. 
THE COURT: With special questions to 
tnke care of each one." 
It will be noted that after the trial court stated that 
the eases were going to be tried together no objection 
was made by appellants' attorney. There is no record 
ot' any objection which would make the order of the 
court reviewable on appeal. The complaint, the amend-
ed complaint and the second amended complaint de-
seribe all three parcels in separate ownership. The 
record of the proceedings before trial discloses just 
ubout all conceivable objections but there is nothing 
to indicate that the defendants in any of the seven 
hearings made any objections to the one case being 
tiled covering all three parcels, or objected to any ruling 
on the subject. One case was filed and the trial court 
properly tried it as one case: 
"The rule is well recognized that an objection 
must be made in the trial court to reserve a ques-
tion for review in the appellate court." 4 C.J .S. 
p. 760. 
See also Pettingill Y. Perkins, 272 P.2d 185; 2 Utah 2d 
266: Drunnnond Y. LTnion Pac. R. Co., 177 P. 2d 903, 
Ill rtah 289; Huber Y. X ewman, 145 P. 2d 780, 106 
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Utah 363; Geros v. Harries, 236 P. 220, 65 Utah 2:.!7. 
39 A.L.R: 1297. 
This rule applies to separate trials. 
"Generally, objections cannot be made for the 
first time in the appellate court with respect to 
proceedings preliminary to the trial or hearing, 
such as the consolidation of actions . . . the grant 
or denial of a severance ... " 4 C.J.S. p. 848. 
Shelton v. Barry, 66 NE 2d 697, 328 Ill. App. 
497; McCormick v. Kopmann, 161 NE 2d 48. 
The following well-settled rules are applicable: 
"An appellate court will not disturb the exer-
cise by the trial court of its discretion as to the 
course and conduct of a trial unless an abuse of 
discretion clearly appears." 5A C.J.S. p. 86. 
This rule applies to the discretion of the trial court 
with respect to the allowance of separate trials. 5.A 
C.J.S. pp. 78, 79. 
See also, Reynolds v. Pierce, (Tex.) 320 SW 
2d 376; N at'l Electric Supply Co. v. Mt. Diablo 
etc. School Dist., 9 Cal. R 864; 187 C.A. 2d 418. 
There is no record whatever to support the appel· 
lants' contention that the trial court abused its discre· 
tion in conducting the trial as it did. The argument in 
the appellants' brief on this point, pp 3-6, contains no 
reference to the record, except to R. 236, which is the 
statement of the court quoted above, "We're trying 
them all together now . . " 
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There being no proof of objcdioll in the trial court 
nm· proof ot' abuse ot' discretion, the appellants tnust 
t'nil on this point. 
II 
TII11~ ORDER DE~YING A NEW TRI.rtL 
~lUST BE .\FFilL\IED BECAUSE THERE IS 
~0 E\"IDE~CE BEFORE THE COURT OF 
.\Bl'SE o:F DISCRETION. 
The appellants filed a 1notion for a new trial upon 
the grounds of ( 1) irregularity in the proceedings, 
(:!) inadequate dmnages and (3) insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict. The motion was argued 
orally and then each side submitted a written memoran-
dum. (H. n:!-96 and 97-103). The court then rendered 
n memorandum <lecision as follows: 
"The order may be that unless the plaintiff, 
within ten days frmn today, consents that the 
separate verdicts as to Keller and Avon may be 
increased hy $664.00 and by $158.00 respective-
ly. the tnotion for a new trial may be granted. 
So. if the consent is filed the Clerk will make 
' 
compute, sign, and file an amended judgment. 
lf the consent be not filed, then the new trial 
may be deen1ed granted and the case placed on 
the trial calendar. 
''As to the merits of the motion, the court feels 
to follow the Inajority of the Supreme Court of 
Ctah in the Boden case, wherein :\ir. Justice 
Crockett, with the concurrence of Justices Wade 
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and McDonough, with the late Justice Worthen 
specially concurring, asserted and determined 
that trial courts have the inherent power to per-
mit additur. This court has carefully read the 
dissenting opinion of Mr. Henry Henroid in that 
case and has only one further observation to 
make. Judge Henroid speaks of grossly inade-
quate verdicts, but the verdict in this case was 
not grossly inadequate but was only slightly 
inadequate. So, feeling that it has the inherent 
power to make the order, and holding that the 
jury in the First District must render verdicts 
not higher than the evidence j ustifi~s and not 
lower (in conden1na tion cases) than the lowest 
valuation placed by any witness on either side, 
the order may be in accordance with the lan-
guage previously used." (R. 104}. 
The appellants are seeking the reversal of the order 
denying the motion for a new trial based upon a tabula-
tion of the testimony of witnesses, lay and expert, who 
testified as to value. It is stated on page 8 of appellants' 
brief as follows: 
"The defendants believe that when the jury 
returned a verdict contrary to the evidence and 
lower than the testimony of any witness, it was 
shown on the face of it that there was error in 
the form of influence of passion or prejudice, 
or of refusal of the jury to follow the court's 
instructions. In any event there was no evidence 
which would justify the verdict ... " 
The tabulation shows that in each case the verdict 
was higher than the testimony of one or more expert 
witness: 
10 
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Kt'llcr Corporation 
\\'itness Alden Adains-$6080.00- Verdict 
*liHti:J.OO 
Summers 
\\"itness A l<len Adams-$6825.00-V erdict 
*H.);)H.OO 
. lt•on Land and Livestock Co. 
\\'itness .Alden Adams-$4450.00; Palmer $3285.00 
- \" erdict $5252.00 
During the five-day trial there was much evidence 
addurt'd on damages which does not appear on the 
tabulations including evidence on topography, vegeta-
tion. water holes, grazing practices and comparable 
salt's. Also, the court and jury inspected the premises. 
The trial court and jury had the advantage of all this 
evidence. 
The appellants point out that in the Keller and 
. \,·on cases the answer of the jury on severance was 
slightly less than the testimony of any witness. The 
reason for this n1ight be apparent had all of the evidence 
been before the court. Several ranchers in the area testi-
fied on matters bearing on the question of severance. 
Xeither the jury nor the trial court on motion for new 
trinl was required to ignore the abundance of evidence 
which related to severance nor were they bound to con-
sider only expert testimony. In the case of Weber 
Basin \Yater Conservancy District v. Nelson, II Utah 
"2d :!53. 358 P. 2d 81, this court said: 
11 
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"The jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve 
in part or in whole the testimony of the two ap-
praisers." 
See also United States v. 2049 Acres of Land, 49 
Fed. Supp. 20, at page 23: 
"While a jury has no right arbitrarily to ig-
nore or discredit the testimony of unimpeached 
witnesses so far as they testify to facts~ and that 
a wilful disregard of such testimony will be 
ground for a new trial, no such obligation at-
taches to witnesses •who testify merely to their 
opinions; the jury may deal with it as they please, 
giving it credence or not as their own experi-
ence or general knowledge of the subject may 
dictate .... The jury even if such testimony be 
uncontradicted, may exercise their independent 
judgment." (Citing Supreme Court of the 
Unied States cases.) "The motion for new trial 
is overruled." 
In Murray v. United States, (U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia), 130 F. 2d 442, the 
appellate court considered a case in which the verdict 
was lower than the appraisal of any expert. We quote 
from the opinion: 
"1. The ground on which it is argued that the 
verdict was inadequate is that one of the parcels 
(Murray's) was valued by the jury at consider-
ably less than its recent purchase price, and that 
both parcels were valued by the jury at $4500, 
which was some $900 less than the appraisal of 
any expert witness. But the jury were permitted 
to view the property and form an opinion of 
their own as to its Yalue. They also considered 
evidence that sirnilar unimproved property sold 
12 
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for as little as *.>OO an acre and as much as $3,000 
an acre. The ar:.'a in question contains a little 
more than two acres, making the valuation of 
the jury approximately $2,000 an acre. 
''(1, :.?] In the light of this additional evi-
dence. they were not bound by the testimony of 
the experts. \Ve have said Inore than once before 
that it is the province of the jury to weigh the 
evidence after seeing and hearing all the wit-
nesses and viewing the premises, and when they 
reach a valuation frmn the evidence which the 
trial court confirms, it is not for us to say that 
it is so inadequate that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Willis 
,., { ~nited States, 69 App. D.C. 129, 99 F.2d 362; 
.Johnson & Wimsatt v. Hazen, 69 App. D.C. 
151, 99 F.2d 384. To the same effect are Colum-
bia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217 U.S. 
;>47, 560, 30 S.Ct. 531, 54 L.Ed. 877, 19 Ann. 
Cas. 854, and Barnes v. South Carolina P.S. 
Authority, 120 F.2d 439." 
It is clear that the contention that the verdict was 
so inadequate that it showed passion and prejudice in 
all three cases is not supported even by the small part 
of the evidence before this court. 
Furthern1ore, where all the evidence is not before 
the appellate court every presumption will be indulged 
in favor of the judgment. The rule is stated as follows: 
"Thus it is a general rule, where the evidence 
i~ not ~reser~·ed in the. record that every presump-
tion will be Indulged In favor of the judgment or 
award on questions of fact .... So in the absence 
of any contrary showing in the record, it will be 
13 
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presumed that the commissioners or jurors pos-
sessed the necessary qualifications; that they 
were duly sworn; that they followed instructions 
and applied correct rules as to the damages, tak-
ing into account all proper items of damage and 
excluding those not authorized by the pleadings 
and evidence, that they acted in good faith ac-
cording to their actual judgment; that they con-
sidered all competent evidence, and none other; 
and that they based their conclusion, in part at 
least, on an inspection of the premises, or on 
testimony of value alone, accordingly as they 
did or did not view the premises ... " 30 C.J.S. 
pp. 49, 50. 
Other applicable rules are as follows: 
" ... The verdict or findings in condemnation 
proceedings, although subject to appellate re-
view, will not be disturbed unless clearly or mani-
festly erroneous. The questions of value and of 
damages are brought before the court on appeal 
from the award, but the court is reluctant to in-
terfere with the award on such questions; it 
accords great weight and respect to the verdict 
or findings of the jury on these questions; it will 
not substitute its judgment, opinion, or conclu-
sion for that of the jury, commissioners, or trial 
court as to the amount of damages to be award-
ed; it will not disturb the award because it seems 
to the appellate court or because such court thinks 
or is of the opinion, that the amount is inade-
quate, excessive, or extravagant, unless the 
amount is clearly, manifestly or obviously ex-
cessive or inadequate, or is grossly excessive or 
inadequate or is excessive or inadequate as to 
be unconscionable, or as to mnount to a denial of 
justice, or carry with it the improbability of its 
14 
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t•orn·dness, or iudieate that the award was made 
on un erroneous principle or was the result of pas-
sion, prejudicl', partiality, corruption, arbitrary 
action, or the like." 30 C.J.S. pp. 51, 52 . 
. \n excellent stateinent of the rule respecting the 
re,·iew of jury verdicts and orders denying motions 
t'or a new trial was tnade by this court in the case of 
Ueynolds Y. \V. ,V. Clyde & Co., 5 Utah 2d 151, 298 
P.:!d 530: 
"There were but two eyewitnesses to the inci-
dent, the plaintiff and the defendant flagman. 
Their testimony was diametrically opposed, and 
there was more than ample evidence which, if 
believed by the jury, would support its verdict. 
\\T e sustain such verdict as a matter of course, 
as many times we have said we must do. Only 
those verdict that appeal to be unsupported by 
any credible evidence that would justify them 
in the minds of reasonable men, do we disturb. 
That is the jury system . . . " 
" ... 'V e consider and hold that the trial court 
did not err, as plaintiff contends, in denying the 
motion for a new trial, since, in cases where there 
is substantial evidence which, if believed, will 
support the jury's verdict, the court may exer-
cise its discretion in sustaining the verdict, and 
we, having no discretion in such event, must sus-
tain both.'' 
In the instant case. there being no evidence before 
this court except the tabulation of expert testimony, 
it cannot be said that there was no evidence before the 
jury to sustain its ,·erdict, nor can it be said that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion 
for a new trial. 
15 
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III 
ADDITUR WAS PROPER AND IX 
GRANTING ADDITUR THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
As indicated above we contend that this court must 
affirm, because of the failure of the appellants (1) to 
include in the record on appeal all of the evidence before 
the court and jury, (2) to show that there was no com-
petent evidence to support the verdict, and (3) to 
prove that the trial court abused its discretion in deny-
ing motion for a new trial. We believe that this dispo-
sition must be made of the case whether or not additur 
was proper. 
Any argument over additur would necessarily turn 
on the question of evidence to support the verdict and 
the court's order denying a new trial. The evidence is 
not before this court and the ruling of trial court must 
stand. 
The trial court granted additur in two of the three 
cases requiring the plaintiff to pay Keller Corporation 
$664.00 and requiring payment of $158.00 to Avon 
Land and Livestock Co. In the Summers case there 
was no additur and there was no claim that the verdict 
was not supported by the tabulation of evidence before 
this court on appeal. 
The appellants contend that additur cannot be 
granted in a condemnation case because there is no 
statutory provision for additur, and that granting 
16 
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additur violated the appellants' right to have the issues 
uf vnlue mul dmnngcs tried by a jury. 
There is no special constitutional provision iu Utah 
grnnting a right of trial by jury in condemnation cases . 
... \rtide I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah pro-
vides: 
"Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation." 
Nor is there a statutory right to a trial of the issues 
of compensation and damages in a condemnation case 
which is any different than the right to a trial by jury 
in any other kind of civil case. Section 78-34-10 provides 
t'or n trial of such cases by "the court, jury or referee." 
r nder Rule 38 of Rules of Civil Procedure, "any party 
may demand a trial of any issue triable of right by a 
jury by paying the statutory jury fee ... " 
Insofar as the right of trial by jury is concerned 
there is no distinction between a condemnation case and 
any other case, whether it be a statutory or a common 
law case. The appellants' entire argument that the 
court has no power or authority to grant additur in 
this case is based upon the assun1ption that under our 
rtah Constitution and statutes there is difference be-
tween the two types of cases. In discussing the right 
to a trial by jury the appellants say on pages 11 and 
12 of their brief: 
" ... That is to say, without a statutory en-
actnlent there would be no such action as emi-
nent do~ai~. Cons~qu~ntly, we have this query: 
If the Jury s verdict Is less than the testimony 
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of any witness, and the court so recognizes it, 
has the court the right in the State of U tab to 
say, the jury made a mistake in its verdict, but 
I have the right to substitute my theory of addi-
tur? Does the court, by such a theory, take away 
the defendants' right to trial by jury? Can it 
say, whether you like it or not, you'll now have 
a trial by the court? There is no case in the State 
of Utah exactly in point, certainly not the case 
of Boden vs. Suhrmann, 327 P. 2d 826, which 
involved a common law action and not a pro-
ceeding in eminent domain. There are, however, 
a great number of cases in other states which 
do have application ... " 
There being no distinction in this regard between 
statutory and common law actions, the case of Bodon 
v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826, is control-
ling. This Court, after considering the same arguments 
as are made by the appellants in the instant case, held: 
" . . . There is implicit within the authority 
of the court to grant a new trial on the stautory 
ground of 'excessive or inadequate damages***' 
the power to order a new trial conditionally: 
that is, to order that a new trial be granted un-
less the party adversely affected by the order 
agrees to a remittitur or an additur of the dam-
ages to an amount within proper limits as viewed 
by the court. A motion for a new trial based on 
such grounds invokes the exercise of such pre· 
rogative of the trial court; and likewise of this 
court on appeal." 
In view of the fact that the trial court had authority 
to grand additur the only question remaining is whether 
the denial of the 1notion for a new trial upon the pay· 
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ments of *158.00 in the A Yon case and $66~.00 in the 
Keller case constituted an abuse of discretion. In the 
nbsence of the record of all of the evidence bearing on 
\'nlue and damagt·s, the appellants have not shown and, 
indeed, cannot show that the verdicts in the two cases 
as increased by the court were "unsupported by credible 
l'videm·e." within the rule of Reynolds v. W. W. Clyde 
l\. l'o., supra, or that there was abuse of discretion by 
trial jwlge who had all of the evidence before him when 
he ruled on the motion for a new trial. 
IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSPEND-
ING INTEREST. 
The appellants contend that the trial court erred 
in suspending interest on the award as a condition to 
granting a continuance of the trial. The order com-
plained of was made on stipulation of counsel and can 
not be assailed on appeal. On pages 239 and 240 of the 
Transcript of Proceedings before Trial appears the 
following: 
"THE COURT: Now I will rule on the evi-
dence, assuming that I'm still in the case as of 
that time, ba~e~ on what authorities you dig 
out. So what do we do now? We continue the 
partition case, suspend-
:\IR. SKEEN: Suspend the interest. 
:\~R. ::\I.AXN: ~et's have. an understanding on 
the mterest. The Interest will be suspended, and 
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let's get it in the record, from March fifth to ~lar 
first. · 
THE COURT: That's all right. 
MR. SKEEN: Yes. 
MR. MANN: Because that's the only differ-
ence that you can be out anything." 
In the minute order for March 11, 1963, reproduced 
in the Record on page 119, appears the following: 
"The above entitled matter came on for hear-
ing on motions and further pre-trial this day. 
E. J. Skeen Esq., appears as counsel for the 
plaintiff and Walter Mann Esq. appearing as 
counsel for the defendants. 
"Certain stipulations are made by counsel. It 
is stipulated that the matter be tried on May I, 
1963 at 10 o'clock A.M. Defendant agreeing to 
waive all interest accrued from March 4 to date 
of trial." 
The trial was postponed pursuant to stipulation, 
the case was tried and if the appellants ever did have a 
right to complain, it was waived. Furthermore, there 
is no appeal from this order. See the notice of appeal. 
(R. 110). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summers Property 
Only two points relied upon by the appellants re· 
late to this property, ( 1 ) the alleged refusal of the 
court to try the cases separately, and (2) the suspension 
of interest. The plaintiffs have no record showing a 
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motion <1r request for separate trials, or that an objec-
tion wns mnde to the statement by the trial court that 
the eases would be tried together. \ Vith respect to Point 
( ~) the record shows a stipulation by counsel for the 
suspension of' interest. In view of the familiar rule 
that objections n1ust be Inade in the trial court to reserve 
questions for review in the appellate court these two 
points are without merit. 
Keller and A ·con Properties 
The contention that the verdicts were inadequate 
\r:ts considered by the trial court with all of the oral and 
documentary evidence before it. In the absence of the 
romplete record this court must presume that the evi-
dence supported the order denying the motion for a 
nt·w trial. There being no proof of abuse of discretion 
the order must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. J .SKEEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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